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Introduction: A primer on information
and influence in animal communication
ulrich e. stegmann
What is surprising is that, despite this intensive study, the whole subject [of
animal communication] is extremely confused, largely because of the def-
initions of the various terms that have been used. While this was already
true when the first edition of this book was written, the confusions have
now reached monumental proportions, with leading theorists even dis-
agreeing as towhat should properly be called ‘a signal’ or ‘communication’.
Marian Dawkins (1995, p. 72)
[T]here is widespread and often unrecognized confusion about the kinds of
signal that exist, the mechanism responsible for their evolution, and the
terms to be used to describe them . . . So it may be that a disagreement about
terminology in a particular case is not about theories, or the words used to
describe them, but about what the world is like.
John Maynard Smith and David Harper (2003, p. 2)
Introduction
A midsummer evening in a temperate forest: male fireflies emit pulses
of light from specialised organs as they fly about in search of females. Females
respond by emitting their own light pulses, which prompt males to approach
them. A dialogue of light pulses ensues until themales have located the females
(Lewis & Cratsley, 2008). Mate recognition in fireflies illustrates some basic
features of animal communication: a sender sends a physical signal, which is
perceived by a receiver who responds to it. In fireflies the initial sender is the
male, whose signal is the light pulse, and the receiver is the responding female.1
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1 The roles of sender and receiver reverse when the female emits her own light pulse.
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Signals arephysical events, behaviours or structures towhich receivers respond.
Yet they are more than that, according to the standard view in ethology (e.g.
Hauser, 1996; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011a). As the colloquial meaning of
‘signal’ suggests, animal signals are events that convey information to receivers,
where information is the contentofa signal, orwhat the signal is about.For instance,
the light pulses of fireflies reveal information about location, motivational state
andspecies identity; the lightpulsesofamale convey, “Here I amin timeandspace,
a sexuallymaturemale of species X that is ready tomate. Over.” (Lloyd, 1966, p. 69).
However, such explicit specifications of information contents are rare
(e.g. Owren & Rendall, 1997), not least because identifying specific contents is
difficult (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Hauser, 1996). Normally contents are circum-
scribed in vaguer terms, such as ‘information about food’, or they are invoked
indirectly by classifying signals as, for instance, predator or alarm calls. Yet the
underlying assumption is always that signals carry information in the sense of
having some more or less specific content. Unsurprisingly then, information
has found its way into formal definitions of signals and communication: com-
munication is often defined as the process of conveying information from senders
to receivers by means of signals, and signals as the behaviours or structures that
senders evolved in order to convey information (Table 1).
Table 1 Examples of informational and non-informational definitions of animal signals
and communication. Note that both Wilson (1975) and Maynard Smith and Harper (2003)
excluded information only for the purposes of defining signals and communication; they did
not reject the idea that both phenomena involve information.
Informational Non-informational
Signal “[Signals are] behavioral,
physiological, or morphological
characteristics fashioned or
maintained by natural selection
because they convey information
to other organisms.” (Otte, 1974,
p. 385)
“We define a ‘signal’ as any act or
structure that alters the behaviour
of other organisms, which evolved
because of that effect, and which is
effective because the receiver’s
response has also evolved.”
(Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003,
p. 3)
Communication “I consider communication to be any
sharing of information between
entities – in social communication,
between individual animals.”
(Smith, 1997, p. 11)
“Biological communication is the
action on the part of one organism
(or cell) that alters the probability
pattern of behavior in another
organism (or cell) in a fashion
adaptive to either one or both the
participants.” (Wilson, 1975, p. 176)
2 Ulrich E. Stegmann
As structures that evolved to convey information, signals are typically con-
trasted with cues, which are behaviours or structures that convey information
without having evolved for this purpose (e.g. Otte, 1974; McGregor, 1993;
Hasson, 1994; but see Hauser, 1996). Rattling by rattlesnakes has probably
evolved to ward off predators by conveying the information that the snake is
venomous, i.e. rattling is a signal. But rattling can be a cue as well (Swaisgood,
Rowe & Owings, 1999). The click rate and dominant frequency of the rattling
sound of Pacific rattlesnakes correlate with a snake’s body temperature and
size, respectively (Rowe & Owings, 1990). California ground squirrels use these
sound properties to adjust their degree of vigilance. Squirrels become more
vigilant in response to rattling sounds from warmer snakes (Figure 1;
Swaisgood et al., 1999), which are more agile and therefore more dangerous.
For the squirrels, click rate and dominant frequency thus carry information
about snake temperature and size, and they are cues because they did not evolve
in order to convey such information.
Although information is a central and entrenched concept in animal com-
munication studies, it seems possible to describe communication without it.
The first paragraph of this introduction sketched firefly communication simply
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Figure 1 Mean rate (+SE) of tail flagging by squirrels during the first 2 minutes
following playback of soft and loud tones (ST and LT, respectively) and of rattling
sounds of small (S) and large (L) as well as cold (C) and warm (W) rattlesnakes. Squirrels
flagged their tails significantly more in response to rattles than to tones, and more to
rattles from warm snakes than to rattles from cold snakes. Warm snakes produce
rattles that are both louder and have a higher click rate than those produced by cold
snakes, which are less dangerous to squirrels. Graph reproducedwith permission from
Swaisgood et al. (1999); rattlesnake reproduced with permission from Richard Coss.
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in terms of what some individuals do (emitting a light pulse) and how others
respond (emitting another light pulse/approaching). We can even define signals
and communication without appeal to information (Table 1). Why then intro-
duce apparently intangible postulates such as content, message, meaning or
information? Why not do without them? Doing away with information con-
cepts, minimising their role or supplementing them with concepts like manip-
ulation is what some ethologists advocate (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Johnstone,
1997; Owren & Rendall, 1997; Owings & Morton, 1998; Rendall, Owren & Ryan,
2009; Carazo & Font, 2010). Questions about the legitimacy of information will
be addressed later in this chapter. The following section focuses on the concept
of information itself.
Information
Colloquial information
Signals are taken to convey information in the sense that they are about
something, or have content (e.g. Halliday, 1983; Dawkins, 1995). But what does
it mean to say that signals have content? This question is rarely addressed
explicitly. Yet judging by how terms such as ‘information’ are employed in
practice, it appears that much work in animal communication is based on
three distinct but closely related answers (I will refer to these as ‘content 1’
etc. later in this introduction).
(1) Predictions and knowledge
Many authors use ‘information’ interchangeably with what receivers
come to know (e.g. Krebs &Dawkins, 1984; Seyfarth &Cheney, 2003; Bradbury &
Vehrencamp, 2011a), what they infer (e.g. Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Slocombe &
Zuberbu¨hler, 2005) or what they predict when perceiving a signal (e.g. Smith,
1997; Seyfarth et al., 2010). In other words, a signal’s information content is
often equated with what receivers predict, infer or learn from it. And this
practice suggests a first answer to what having content consists in: signals
have content (or, equivalently, carry information) when they enable receivers
to predict something from their occurrence.
Predicting is frequently understood in a qualitative sense (e.g. Krebs&Dawkins,
1984; Smith, 1986; Seyfarth et al., 2010). There is, however, a quantitative
framework for modelling predictions: statistical decision theory (Bradbury &
Vehrencamp, 2011a; see also Ch. 3). The basic idea in applying statistical decision
theory is that animals constantly face decisions about how to act and that they use
information (knowledge) to choose among alternative courses of action. Animals
come equippedwith some degree of background knowledge about the probability
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of certain events, which derives from earlier experiences and/or from heritable
biases due to past selection. In order to achieve optimal decisions, animals con-
tinually update their prior informationby attending to appropriate current events.
Consider contests among red deer stags over access to females. Frequent
components of stag contests are roaring matches, which are usually won by
the more frequently roaring male (Clutton-Brock & Albon, 1979). Faced with a
roaring harem-holder, a challenger must decide whether to retreat or keep
roaring. Stags base their decisions on an estimate of their opponent’s fighting
ability. Fighting ability comes in degrees, but let us assume for illustrative
purposes that rivals categorise one another as being either weak (W) or strong
(S). If prior knowledge suggests to amale that its rival is as likely to beweak as he
is strong [P(W) = P(S) = 0.5], then such knowledge is of little help in deciding
whether or not to retreat. However, fighting ability correlates with roaring:
weak males roar less frequently than strong males (Clutton-Brock & Albon,
1979; Reby et al., 2005). Males can use knowledge of this correlation to predict
the fighting ability of opponents (Box 1).
Box 1 A simple application of statistical decision theory
According to statistical decision theory, predicting or inferring something
from the occurrence of a signal amounts to calculating a conditional
probability. A conditional probability is the probability of an event or state
on the condition that some other event or state has occurred. Inferring
something from a signal involves calculating the conditional probability of
an event on the condition that the animal has observed that the signal has
occurred. So, when a stag infers the fighting ability of a rival (the state) from
his roar (the signal), he effectively ‘calculates’ the conditional probability
that his rival has a certain fighting ability on the condition that he roars
with a certain frequency.
Suppose that stags are either weak (W) or strong (S) and they either roar
frequently (F) or infrequently (I). If a stag perceives his rival roar frequently,
then the stag calculates two conditional probabilities: the probability that
(1) the rival is weak on the condition that he roars frequently and the
probability that (2) the rival is strong on the condition that (again) he roars
frequently. To simplify matters, we will only consider how the stag
calculates probability (1), which is written P(W|F), where ‘|’ means ‘given’
(not to be confused with ‘/’, the symbol for division). One way to calculate
P(W|F) is to use Bayes’ theorem:
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PðWjFÞ ¼ PðWÞ  PðFjWÞ
PðWÞ  PðFjWÞ þ PðSÞ  PðFjSÞ
In order to calculate P(W|F), the stag needs some background knowledge.
First, he needs to know how probable it is to encounter rivals that are weak
and rivals that are strong. These are the ‘prior probabilities’, P(W) and P(S).
They are independent of having heard a rival’s roar.
Second, the stag needs to know how strongly roaring correlates with
fighting ability. Such correlations are estimated as the conditional
probabilities that a certain type of signal will be produced by the sender (or
perceived by the receiver) given a certain state of the world. With two types
of signal and two states there are four conditional probabilities:
State or event in the world
Signal Strong male (S) Weak male (W)
Frequent roaring (F) P(F|S) P(F|W)
Infrequent roaring (I) P(I|S) P(I|W)
This table is a coding matrix. It specifies the degree to which a state or
event in the world affects the probability that a signal will be produced (or
perceived). For instance, it specifies how the fact that a male is weak affects
the probability that he roars frequently, P(F|W) (this is the converse of the
probability the stag needs to calculate, P(W|F)).
The stag can now ‘update’ his prior probability that the rival is weak. This
process can be modelled with Bayes’ theorem. Suppose the stag’s prior
probability that the rival is weak is P(W) = 0.5. So, without having heard the
rival’s roar, the rival is equally likely to be weak or strong [P(S) = 0.5].
Suppose also that the stag knows about the following correlations between
roaring and fighting ability: strong males roar frequently 80% of the time
and infrequently 20% of the time [P(F|S) = 0.8, P(I|S) = 0.2], whereas weak
males roar infrequently 95% of the time and frequently 5% of the time
[P(I|W) = 0.95, P(F|W) = 0.05]. Inserting these values into Bayes’ theorem
yields:
PðWjFÞ ¼ 0:5 0:05
0:5 0:05þ 0:5 0:8 ¼ 0:06
The result shows that the stag has learned something from the
rival’s frequent roaring. Hearing the rival roar frequently reduces the
stag’s estimate of the probability that his rival is weak from an
initial 50% to a mere 6%. In other words, the stag can now be
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Statistical decision theory is not only a quantitative tool for modelling how
andwhat receivers predict from signals. Ecologists studying foraging behaviour,
too, understand the idea that cues carry information/content as a matter of
allowing predictions, and they employ statistical decision theory to model this
process (e.g. Valone, 1989; Giraldeau, 1997; Danchin et al., 2004; Stephens, 2007;
Wagner & Danchin, 2010). Indeed, a rich and partly controversial taxonomy of
types of information has been developed along these lines (e.g. Danchin et al.,
2004; Wagner & Danchin, 2010). One of the proposals is to distinguish between
private and public information. European starlings probe the ground for insects
and so acquire knowledge about patch quality, which is then used in foraging
decisions, for instance when to leave the current patch for another (private
information: knowledge of x gathered from direct contact with x). Instead of
probing for insects themselves, individuals may also gain this information by
observing their flockmates’ probing success (Templeton & Giraldeau, 1996). The
latter is public information: knowledge of x gathered from a cue of x.
It is tempting to believe that predictions, inferences and knowledge imply
cognitive or psychological processing on the receiver’s part, perhaps even con-
scious awareness. Indeed, key steps of decision-making have neural correlates
(reviewed in Lee, 2010, and Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011c). But cognitive
capabilities are implied in neither foraging ecology nor animal communication.
Quantitative and informal work in these areas remains explicitly neutral on
fairly confident that the rival is not weak. He can adjust his behaviour
accordingly.
Two points are worth emphasising. First, when a receiver has used a
signal to update its estimate of the probability of certain events, it has
just made the first step. In order to use what it has learned to guide its
behavioural response, the receiver also needs to take into account the
fitness costs of making correct as opposed to incorrect choices of action
(Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011b). Second, updating critically depends on
what the receiver knows about the correlations between signals and
world states (the coding). From the point of view of statistical decision
theory, the signal by itself, without the coding, carries no information
(J. Bradbury, personal communication). As mentioned in the main
text, a signal’s carrying information can be understood as enabling
receivers to infer something from it. Since without coding
receivers cannot infer anything from a signal, the signal itself carries
no information.
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the mechanistic aspects of deriving predictions (Danchin et al., 2004; Stephens,
2007; McNamara & Dall, 2010; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011a). In some spe-
cies, inferences from signals may just consist in simple learned associations or
evolved dispositions (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Smith, 1997). Likewise, predic-
tions from cues may consist in non-cognitive processes (Danchin et al., 2004;
McNamara & Dall, 2010).
(2) Mental representations
A more demanding view about the nature of signal content emerged
in work on ‘referential’ signals. Referential signals allow receivers to infer
features of the external environment instead of, or in addition to, features of
the sender (variously labelled “semantic”, “referential”, “symbolic”; reviewed
in Hauser, 1996). The alarm calls of vervetmonkeys are a well-known example
(Seyfarth, Cheney & Marler, 1980). Vervets emit three acoustically different
types of calls in response to three different types of predators: leopards, eagles
and snakes (Figure 2). Listeners respond to the calls in a way appropriate for
the type of predator. For example, calls emitted in response to approaching
eagles prompt vervets to seek cover in bushes, whereas calls emitted in
response to snakes elicit upright posture and scanning of the ground. These
calls appear to function like labels for things in the world, in this case types of
predators, much like some words in human languages (Hauser, 1996;
Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007).
Animal signals are called “functionally referential” when they function like
labels (e.g. Marler, Evans & Hauser, 1992; Macedonia & Evans, 1993; Fischer
et al., 1995; Evans & Evans, 1999; Manser, Bell & Fletcher, 2001). This leaves
open whether the signals are like words in the additional sense of eliciting
mental representations of the referent in the minds of receivers, i.e. internal
representations which mediate receiver responses. Such “representational”
(Hauser, 1996; Evans & Evans, 2007) or “conceptual” signals (Zuberbu¨hler
et al., 1999) are taken to be close to human words on the basis of assuming
that human words refer to things indirectly, via something in the mind of
receivers, an abstraction or concept (e.g. Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Hauser,
1998) or amental representation (Evans, 1997; see also Box 2). According to the
most demanding view of informational communication, referential signals
have content only in the case that receivers infer or predict something from
it by means of internal representations, or even mental “images” (Maynard
Smith & Harper, 2003; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; cf. Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011;
Wheeler et al., 2011). Accordingly, the term ‘information’ is sometimes used to
denote whatever a receiver’s mental representations encode (Maynard
Smith & Harper, 2003; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003).
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(3) Correlation
What enable animals to make predictions from signals are correlations
between signals and other states or events. In some contexts, correlations are
deemed sufficient for signals to have content. The state or event with which the
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Figure 2 Vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) give acoustically distinct alarm calls
in response to leopards (A), eagles (B) and snakes (C). The acoustic features of alarm
calls also differ from the predators’ own vocalisations (e.g. vervet eagle alarm calls do
not sound like eagle shrieks). When encountering one of these predators directly,
vervets react in a manner specific and adaptive to the kind of predator involved, e.g.
standing upright and scanning the ground when perceiving a python (D: python
approaching from the lower right-hand side of the photo). Playback experiments in
the wild showed that simply hearing an alarm call given in response to one type of
predator, without perceiving the predator itself, triggers the appropriate behavioural
response. Variations in acoustic features that may be associated with a sender’s fear
(e.g. call amplitude, or loudness) have no significant effect on the type of response.
For these reasons, vervet alarm calls are considered to be “referential” or “semantic”,
i.e. “signs [that] refer to objects in the external world” (Seyfarth et al., 1980, p. 1070).
The study by Seyfarth et al. (1980) generated much interest in the presence of
referential signalling in other species (reviewed in Seyfarth et al., 2010; Fedurek &
Slocombe, 2011; see Radick, 2007 for a history of playback experiments). A–C:
Sonograms provided by Robert Seyfarth. D: Photo by Richard Wrangham.
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Box 2 Learning theory
Animals that repeatedly experience associations between two events can
change their capacity for certain behaviours (“associative learning”; see
Shettleworth, 2001, for terminological ambiguities). One of the best-known
forms of associative learning is classical conditioning, which involves
unconditioned reflexes. An unconditioned reflex is a behavioural response
that is always triggered by a certain type of stimulus (such as salivation
triggered by food). In classical conditioning experiments, animals are
repeatedly exposed to pairings of the original (unconditioned) stimulus
with a second type of event that does not normally trigger the reflexive
response. After a while, animals perform the behaviour simply after
perceiving the new event on its own. Pavlov famously exposed dogs to both
food and a ringing bell, and the dogs eventually salivated in response to
hearing the bell. What psychological and neural mechanisms are
responsible for this change in the dogs’ capacity to react?
According to associative theories of learning, training ‘stamps in’ the
association between the new (conditioned) stimulus and the behavioural
response. That is, animals acquire a rigid response to the conditioned
stimulus by establishing an excitatory or inhibitory connection between
them (S–R theories). Representational or cognitive theories of learning
propose instead that training creates a connection between the conditioned
stimulus and an ‘expectation’ of the unconditioned stimulus (S–S theories).
The bell triggers a neural representation of food (or a representation of the
relation between the two), and the animal reacts on the basis of this
representation (reviewed in Lieberman, 2003; Shettleworth, 2010). The
classic debate between associative and representational theories of learning
is the background for the contrast some ethologists draw between rigid (or
automatic) and representation-mediated responses (see ‘Colloquial
information’).
Current research favours cognitive theories (Shettleworth, 2010). But it is
acknowledged that there is evidence on both sides (Lieberman, 2003) and
that the nature of the posited neural representations remains elusive
(Gallistel, 2008). One of the strongest lines of evidence in favour of cognitive
learning theories is thought to come from alarm calls in Diana monkeys
(Shettleworth, 2001). Diana monkeys react in the same way to acoustically
distinct vocalisations, e.g. to the shrieks of an eagle and to the eagle alarm
calls of their conspecifics (see figure). This suggests that despite their
differences, the two types of vocalisations evoke the same kind of mental
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Figure Evidence for mental representations of signal referents by receivers
(Zuberbu¨hler et al., 1999). Diana monkeys produce different alarm calls in
response to their predators (eagles and leopards). Females also call in response to
the alarm calls of their male conspecifics. In this set of prime–probe experiments
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signal correlates, or to which it bears a causal relation, is then seen as the
signal’s content. Consider the waggle dance of honeybees, which correlates
with the distance and cardinal direction of valuable resources such as flower
stands (e.g. von Frisch, 1967). In the 1970s an acrimonious debate arose over
whether bee recruits actually use the dance to find the resources, as von Frisch
had claimed, or whether they use the dancer’s odours instead. Interestingly, all
participants of the ‘bee language controversy’ agreed that the dance carries
spatial information; the contentious issue was only whether the recruits use its
information (Dyer, 2002; Munz, 2005). Correlations obtain even if they are not
exploited by receivers. This suggests that all sides of the debate implicitly agreed
that the dance carries spatial information simply in virtue of its correlations
with certain external factors.
representation, which in turn mediates the same type of behavioural
response (Zuberbu¨hler, Cheney & Seyfarth, 1999). In addition to these
behavioural findings, there is also increasing neurophysiological evidence
for mental representations in primate vocal communication: listening to
calls activates the retrieval of associated visual representations (Gil-da-Costa
et al., 2004), and the pre-frontal cortex has been implicated in the
semantic processing of calls (reviewed in Romanski & Ghazanfar, 2010;
see also Ch. 14).
Caption for Box 2 Figure (cont.)
conducted in the wild, a group of females were played one type of vocalisation
(prime) for 5 mins, followed by eagle shrieks (probe). After a strong initial
response, females habituated within 5 mins to the prime. A, Baseline: primed
with eagle shrieks, the females habituated after exposure to further eagle shrieks.
B, Control: after habituating to the leopard alarm calls of males, females
dishabituated in response to eagle shrieks. C, Test: after habituating to eagle
alarm calls, females remainedhabituated to the acoustically distinct eagle shrieks.
The experiment suggests that eagle alarm calls and the shrieks of an eagle carry
the same information for females (‘eagle approaching’) whereas leopard alarm
calls do not. More importantly, the experiment appears to reveal how females
process the vocalisations: the fact that females treat acoustically distinct
vocalisations as the same suggests that the female response is not simply triggered
by the acoustic properties of vocalisations (otherwise the response should be
different). Instead, the response is likely to be mediated by a “common associate,
possibly a mental representation, of the predator category” (Zuberbu¨hler et al.,
1999, p. 41). The methodology of earlier work on vervet alarm calls did not allow
this further conclusion. Modified with permission from Zuberbu¨hler et al. (2009).
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Smith’s (1965) distinction between the “message” and “meaning” of signals is
relevant here. The distinction is influential but also fairly unclear and contro-
versial (e.g. Philips & Austad, 1996; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011b). Perhaps
Smith’s “message” is best understood as what signals correlate with (content 3),
and “meaning” as what receivers infer from signals (content 1).
Mathematical information
As has often been noted, information is sometimes employed in a
quantitative sense, in addition to its colloquial meaning (e.g. Marler, 1961;
Smith, 1965; Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Markl, 1985). Quantitative information
features in studies which apply Claude Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory
of communication to animal signals. Such studiesmeasure what we know today
as the Shannon entrophy of a signal, as well as its conditional entropy and its
transinformation – all quantities of themathematical theory of communication.
One of the earliest studies of this kind explored the visual displays of hermit
crabs. Hermit crabs perform several kinds of displays when other crabs intrude
into their personal space (Hazlett & Bossert, 1965; Laidre, 2009). They may, for
instance, raise their chelipeds up and outwards, or raise one of their walking
legs, or perform some other type of display (Figure 3).
BA
Figure 3 Hermit crabs can deter intruders by raising their limbs up and outwards.
(A) Raising of the cheliped (clawbearing leg) in Anisopagurus pygmaeus. (B) Raising of a
walking leg in Clibanarius cubensis. These visual displays were regarded as examples of
threat signals, conveying the sender’s intent for future agonistic opposition (e.g.
Hazlett & Bossert, 1965). The view that threat signals convey information about sender
intentions was undermined subsequently by findings of poor correlations between
signalling and future aggression, as well as theoretical analyses suggesting that signals
of intent are particularly susceptible to invasion by cheaters. More recent studies,
however, support the viability of intention signalling in hermit crabs. The lack of
correlations is likely to have been due to ignoring confounding variables, especially
receiver responses: when intruders retreat, senders do not back up their displays with
attack (Laidre, 2009). Reprinted with permission from Hazlett and Bossert (1965).
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Hazlett and Bossert (1965) arranged encounters between pairs of crabs and
counted how often crabs performed the various display types. They observed
6138 performances in total, of which 1121 were “major cheliped extensions”.
The cheliped rise therefore had a relative frequency of 1121/6138 = 0.18. And
since relative frequencies can serve as estimates of probabilities, the probability
of a crab raising its cheliped was P(d1) = 0.18 (where d1 stands for cheliped rise).
The probabilities of the other displays (such as raising a walking leg) were
calculated in the same way. Hazlett and Bossert (1965) then calculated the
Shannon entropy of the entire signal repertoire by, first, multiplying the prob-
ability of a given display type with the logarithm of its probability, e.g. multi-
plying P(d1) by log2 P(d1), P(d2) by log2 P(d2), and so on for all display types. For
each type they thus obtained a product. They then summed the products to yield
the Shannon entropy,
H ¼ −∑
i
PðdiÞ  log 2PðdiÞ
where di denotes a kind of display (taking the logarithm to the base of 2 ensures
that the unit is a ‘bit’). Another important quantity is transinformation, which
measures statistical dependencies between two sets of events (e.g. signals and
responses).
Shannon entropy is sometimes referred to as a “measure of information”
(e.g. Shannon, 1948) or even as “information content” (e.g. Quastler, 1958;
Dingle, 1969; Wilson, 1975). So it is tempting to think that Shannon entropy
is, after all, equivalent to (or a measure of) information in the colloquial
sense. But this is not the case, as Shannon (1948), Quastler (1958) and many
ethologists have acknowledged (e.g. Marler, 1961; Smith, 1965; Markl, 1985).
Here is a consideration that can help to explain why this is the case. Suppose
the various display types of hermit crabs are about different things, so that
their information (content) differs. Suppose further that we calculate the
Shannon entropy (H) for the crab’s display repertoire. Since H is an average,
all display types belonging to that repertoire will then have the same value
of H, irrespective of their content. In other words, any two display types with
different information (content) will have the same information (H). Since
colloquial information and H can become separated in this way, they cannot
be identical.
In other respects, however, the relation between the colloquial and mathe-
matical sense of information remains unclear. For example, “technical” or
“Shannon” information is often described as a reduction in uncertainty (e.g.
Halliday, 1983; Krebs & Davies, 1993; Seyfarth et al., 2010), which is also how the
acquisition of knowledge by receivers is described (content 1; e.g. Quastler,
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1958; Wiley, 1983; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2011;
Wheeler et al., 2011). These practices suggest that for many researchers there
is still some continuity between quantitative and colloquial information. To
complicate matters, work in statistical decision theory offers a different yet
explicitly quantitative approach to understanding information. A key quantity
in this context is the change in the probability of a predicted event upon
perceiving a signal (for similar measures see McNamara & Dall, 2010; Skyrms,
2010; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011b).
The next section looks at manipulation, persuasion and influence (see also
Chapters 2, 6–7, 9–10, 16, 18). These notions tend to be used synonymously and
are often advanced as alternatives to information.
Manipulation and influence
Richard Dawkins and John Krebs (1978) were among the first to advo-
cate an explicitly non-informational approach to animal communication.
Signals, they argued, do not evolve to convey information, but rather to
manipulate or persuade (Box 3). Manipulation does not imply (malevolent)
intentions on the part of senders. It only implies that signals evolve in order to
prompt receivers to behave in ways beneficial to the sender, even if the
behavioural response comes at the receivers’ expense. The latter part of this
claim, i.e. that signalling may disadvantage receivers, continues to draw par-
ticular attention (and criticism; see ‘Arguments concerning manipulation’
below). Indeed, manipulation is often understood as an interaction whose
key feature is the fitness cost to receivers (e.g. Smith, 1986; Searcy & Nowicki,
2005; Seyfarth et al., 2010; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011b; Wheeler et al.,
2011).
However, proponents of manipulation insist that receivers need not neces-
sarily suffer fitness costs when being manipulated (Owren, Rendall & Ryan,
2010). This point has been illustrated with the mating calls of Engystomops
frogs (Rendall et al., 2009). Engystomops frogs are a closely related group of species
in which the males emit species-specific calls (‘whines’) to court females. The
males of some species have evolved the ability to (sometimes) add a distinct call
component (‘chucks’) to their whines, which makes the resulting calls more
attractive to females. Female preference for chucks is a sensory bias that pre-
dates the evolution of chucks (Figure 4). Females find them hard to avoid
because they affect highly conserved neural features. The chucks therefore
‘manipulate’ females without females suffering fitness costs by responding
more strongly to calls with chucks (reviewed in Ryan & Rand, 2003; but see
Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011b; see also Ch. 9).
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Box 3 Signal evolution
Among the key tasks in understanding the evolution of animal signals is
specifying the selection pressures that shape signal design. Several
sources of selection pressures have been identified, chief among them the
physical environment and the sensory and neural capacities of receivers.
Signals are selected for properties that make them detectable by the
intended receivers in a given environment (reviewed in Bradbury &
Vehrencamp, 2011a).
The way selection operates raises a fundamental puzzle for the view that
signals evolve to convey information (cf. Markl, 1985). Many modelling
studies have their origin in responses to this puzzle. If signals evolve in
order to convey information, then senders should benefit from conveying
information. But senders do not always benefit from revealing their
intentions (Krebs &Dawkins, 1984). In addition, an honest signalling system
in which all convey true information about themselves can be invaded by
“cheaters” (e.g. Maynard Smith, 1976). Cheaters are animals that signal the
presence of features they do not possess, e.g. aggressive intentions. Since
cheaters benefit from misguiding receivers, their genes spread. Receivers
eventually evolve to ignore the ‘deceiving’ signals, and this creates pressure
on senders to cease signalling. How then could signals ever evolve to convey
information?
Dawkins and Krebs’ (1978) conclusion was that they do not evolve to
convey information in the first place; they evolve to manipulate receivers
instead (a view itself criticised as being evolutionarily implausible; see
main text). Other theorists responded to this puzzle by seeking to identify
evolutionary mechanisms that would allow signals to function as
information transmitters. One of the most influential suggestions was
that the production of signals about the features of senders must be so
costly as to be restricted to senders that actually possess the features
(“handicap” signals, Zahavi, 1975). Zahavi’s suggestion initially met with
skepticism, but over time a consensus emerged that some forms of costs
can lead to honest or reliable signals (reviewed in Searcy & Nowicki, 2005).
Since the 1970s, five additional mechanisms ensuring signal reliability
have been identified (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005). The present consensus is
that most signals are reliable on average, and that they must be reliable in
order to evolve (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005; Seyfarth et al., 2010; but see
Rendall et al., 2009). Evolutionary perspectives are further explored in
Chapters 15 and 16.
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Affect induction
For contemporary proponents of the manipulation view, manipulation
is primarily characterised in terms of the proximate mechanisms that elicit
receiver responses. A prominent example is the “affect-conditioning model” of
non-human primate vocalisations (Owren & Rendall, 1997; later extended to
other mammals in Owren & Rendall, 2001). According to this model, primate
vocalisations employ two basic mechanisms for influencing receiver behaviour,
a direct and an indirect mechanism.
Figure 4 The evolution of male mating calls and female preferences of four
species in the Engystomops (= Physalaemus) pustulosus species group. Each call is
represented by a waveform (top) and a spectrogram (bottom; horizontal
bar = 100 ms, vertical bar = 0–5000 Hz; all to the same vertical scale, but different
horizontal scales). T– indicates the absence of the terminal chuck, in both E.
pustulatus and E. coloradorum, while T+ indicates the presence of the chuck in both E.
pustulosus and E. petersi. P+ indicates that both E. coloradorum and E. pustulosus exhibit a
preference for calls with chucks, despite the fact that the natural E. coloradorum call
lacks a chuck; the preference was shown for an E. coloradorum call with E. pustulosus
chucks appended to it. Analysis of the entire species group and several outgroup
species (not shown) suggests that the ancestral condition of the species group is
T– and P+ (lower box) and that chucks evolved prior to the separation of E. pustulosus
and E. petersi (box T–→ T+). The trait distributions on this cladogram therefore
suggest that the evolution of chucks exploited a preexisting sensory bias in females
(Kirkpatrick & Ryan, 1991). Subsequent work has considerably added to this picture
(e.g. Ryan & Rand, 2003), but also challenged it (Ron, 2008). Redrawn by Michael
Ryan from Kirkpatrick and Ryan (1991).
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The direct mechanism is the immediate impact of a call’s acoustic properties
on the receiver’s sensory and nervous system. Primate squeaks, shrieks and
screams, which include vervet monkey alarm calls, have abrupt-onset pulses
with large frequency and amplitude fluctuations and are highly effective in
evoking attention and arousal. The indirect mechanism relies on pairing vocal-
isations with emotion-inducing behaviours. For instance, dominant animals
frequently antagonise subordinate group members with aggressive acts such
as biting and chasing, which elicit arousal and affect in the subordinates and
corresponding behavioural responses. Because the threat calls are produced
in close temporal proximity to aggressive behaviours, receivers learn to asso-
ciate threat calls with aggressive behaviour through classical conditioning.
Eventually, threat calls become a conditioned stimulus: calls now suffice to
elicit the motivational, emotional and behavioural responses that previously
required aggressive behaviour (Owren & Rendall, 2001).
Owren and Rendall (2001) argued that these two mechanisms underlie most
primate vocalisations and concluded that “a great deal of primate vocal signalling
may be quite unsophisticated, functioning merely to draw another individual’s
attention, change its arousal level, induce affect, or serendipitously pair the
caller’s voice with some positive or negative state in the listener” (p. 69). In
other words, the reason that primate vocalisations are said to lack information
is the unsophisticated nature of signal processing in receivers (not the fitness
costs to receivers). Interestingly, this way of drawing the line between informa-
tion and manipulation parallels the approach taken by some proponents of
information, who regard informational communication as a matter of evoking
mental representations in receivers and who contrast this kind of signal process-
ing with automatic, reflexive reactions which they count as non-informational
forms of interaction (see ‘Colloquial information’).
Assessment/management
Initially, Dawkins and Krebs (1978) portrayed communication as the
process by which senders manipulate receivers. They later revised this view,
conceding that information does play an important role in communication after
all (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). They argued that receivers should evolve “mind-
reading” capabilities (not merely “sales-resistance”, i.e. the ability to withstand
sendermanipulation). Mind-reading is the ability to use statistical regularities in
order to “predict” an animal’s future behaviour (an ability acquired through
individual learning or evolution) or, as they saw it, the ability to gather infor-
mation about senders. Mind-reading does not demand complex cognitive
capacities, let alone the ability to attribute mental states to other animals
(theory of mind).
18 Ulrich E. Stegmann
Krebs and Dawkins’ (1984) view has found support (e.g. Johnstone, 1997;
Carazo & Font, 2010). Donald Owings and Eugene Morton (1998) further devel-
oped this view into the assessment/management approach, according to which
animal communication is the interplay between management on the part of
senders (“managers”) and assessment on the part of receivers (“assessors”).
Management consists in influencing the behaviour of assessors in ways that
benefit themanager: “from the perspective ofmanagement, signals do not refer
to anything; they are pragmatic acts emitted to produce an effect of variable
specificity” (Owings & Morton, 1997, p. 379). However, receivers are not merely
passively used by managers. Assessors seek for cues that allow them to adjust
their behaviour to prevailing circumstances. Assessment is the “active extrac-
tion of the cues needed for adaptive decision-making” (Owings & Morton, 1998,
p. 72). Importantly, since assessors learn something from attending to cues or
signals, assessment is thought to yield information (see also Ch. 8).
While Owings and Morton endorse information as one aspect of communi-
cation, they emphasise that cognitive or “information-processing” mechanisms
are only one of four types of mechanisms of assessment. The three others are
motivational, perceptual and emotional mechanisms. One of Owings and
Morton’s (1997) examples for a motivational mechanism is the effect of song-
bird vocalisations on hormone levels. In simulated territorial intrusion (STI)
experiments, a caged male (or artificial dupe) is placed into the established
territory of another male together with a loudspeaker, which plays the song of
a conspecific male. In some species, STI increases the blood levels of testoster-
one and luteinising hormone in the territory owner, in addition to causing
aggressive behaviour (Figure 5; e.g. Wingfield & Wada, 1989; McGlothlin et al.,
2008; but see Apfelbeck &Goymann, 2011). The call (signal) therefore influences
the owner’s neuroendocrine system (at least in conjunction with non-auditory
cues, Wingfield & Wada, 1989). Owings and Morton concluded that this is a
communicative effect which can hardly be described as information transfer.
Note that information is, again, tied to the proximate mechanisms by which
signals have their effects on receivers.
Evaluating informational and non-informational
explanations of animal communication
So far we have explored how the concepts of information and manipu-
lation are understood and how they are employed in order to explain animal
communication. Both informational and non-informational approaches have
their proponents and critics. Doubts about the legitimacy of informational
explanations have been raised repeatedly (e.g. Dawkins & Krebs, 1978;
A primer on animal communication 19
Owings & Morton, 1997; Owren & Rendall, 2001) and they have received a
moderate degree of attention (e.g. Philips & Austad, 1996; Seyfarth & Cheney,
2003; Scott-Phillips, 2008; Carazo & Font, 2010). An article by Rendall, Owren
and Ryan (2009) brought these doubts to the forefront of ethological research,
eliciting further responses (e.g. Font & Carazo, 2010; Scarantino, 2010; Seyfarth
et al., 2010; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 2011b; Ruxton & Schaefer, 2011; Wheeler
et al., 2011). The purpose of the following three sections is to introduce a few of
the central arguments that have been proposed on either side. These sections
are not intended to adjudicate or to provide a comprehensive survey.
Arguments in favour of information
Empirical support
The most straightforward argument for the appropriateness of infor-
mation is empirical evidence (Seyfarth et al., 2010). Many studies now document
structures or behaviours that (1) correlate with features of the sender or the
environment and (2) elicit suitable responses in other animals (i.e. responses
appropriate to the features with which the structures or behaviours correlate).
One of the earliest studies to meet these criteria was Seyfarth, Cheney and
Marler’s (1980) seminal work on vervet monkeys described above. The three
types of alarm calls are emitted specifically in response to three different types
Figure 5 Testosterone levels in response to a simulated territorial intrusion in dark-
eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). In a simulated territorial intrusion (STI), a caged male was
placed inside the territory of another male and pre-recorded junco songs were played
from a loudspeaker. After 10 minutes the territory owner was captured and a blood
sample taken.Males presentedwith anSTI displayed significantly elevated testosterone
levels following the intrusion (horizontal line:median; shaded box: interquartile range;
bars: range). Reproduced with permission from McGlothlin et al. (2008).
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of predators (criterion 1). Furthermore, calls in the absence of non-acoustic cues
are sufficient to prompt a behavioural response in receivers, and the response is
appropriate for the type of predator that elicits a call (criterion 2). Alarm calls
therefore enable vervets to ‘predict’ that a predator is approaching (at least if
‘prediction’ is understood in an undemanding sense; see ‘Colloquial informa-
tion’). And since signals are taken to carry information when they enable
receivers to predict things from their occurrence, it follows that alarm calls
carry information about specific types of predators.
Theoretical appeal
Another argument in support of the informational approach is its theo-
retical appeal (Seyfarth et al., 2010). The informational view is in linewith cognitive
approaches to learning theory, according towhich learning is amatter of acquiring
information, which in turn involves mental representations (Box 2). Furthermore,
the approach has great explanatory scope. Explaining receiver behaviour in terms
of information content abstracts away from the physical properties of signals,
especially their modality. This renders mathematical models of signal evolution
applicable across taxa andmodalities (Box 3). Critics object, however, that abstract-
ing away from the physical structures has contributed to a neglect of research into
signal production and design (Owings & Morton, 1997; Rendall et al., 2009).
A good heuristic
For decades the informational framework has driven behavioural
research on animal communication. It proves to be a fruitful strategy in other
fields as well (Seyfarth et al., 2010). With respect to the study of human language
evolution, for instance, the framework has elucidated language evolution
Box 4 Animal signals and human language
Is animal signalling a kind of language? What is the relation between
signalling systems and human language more generally? For a long time
language was regarded as the gap separating humans from other animals.
Of course, other animals lack a language insofar as they do not share any of
our culturally specific communication systems (English, Chinese and so on).
But ‘language’ also refers to the internal (neural and psychological) faculty
that allows humans to learn and employ such systems (Hauser, Chomsky &
Fitch, 2002). And with respect to that faculty a nuanced view about the
relation between animal signals and human language has emerged.
Following the linguist David Hockett, many contemporary theorists
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advocate a multi-component view of the language faculty: language is
composed of several partly independent subsystems with their own
functions and neural implementations (e.g. Hauser et al., 2002;
Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Hurford, 2007; Fitch, 2010). A select few of these
components are listed in Table 2. Only some of the components are found in
non-human animal species, and some are at the centre of controversies. For
instance, Hauser et al.’s (2002) hypothesis that recursion (the ability to
understand and produce recursive structures, such as embedded clauses) is
the uniquely human language component reinvigorated interest in
syntactic features of animal signals (e.g. Arnold & Zuberbu¨hler, 2006;
Gentner et al., 2006; Van Heijningen et al., 2009; Wheeler et al., 2011).
Are animal signals evolutionary precursors of human language? It
has been argued that at least some features of primate vocalisations are
precursors of linguistic abilities, e.g. functional reference and the
ordering of call types into sequences (Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011).
According to an early view, language evolved from innate affective
expressions such as sighs and screams, which were regarded as similar to
Table 2 Some components of the human language faculty and their presence in non-
human animals.
Humans (Fitch, 2010) Non-human animals
Ability to learn the production of
large vocabulary
Absent (Fitch, 2010; Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011)
Voluntary signal production Mostly absent, but some species have degrees of
control over signal production (e.g. audience effect)
(Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; Fedurek & Slocombe,
2011)
Discrete infinitya/recursion Absent (Hauser et al., 2002)
Reference (providing information
about external states)
Present in some species (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007)
Senders intend to provide
information (Gricean maxims)
Absent (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; Fedurek &
Slocombe, 2011)
Theory of mind (attributing mental
states to others)
No attribution of beliefs; in some species attribution
of intentions, goals and visual experience (Rosati
et al., 2010; Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011)
Listeners engage in pragmatic
inferences
Present (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003; Fitch, 2010)
aDiscrete infinity is the ability to construct and understand an infinite number of linguistic
expressions where the expressions are composed from a finite set of components.
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by identifying a number of striking similarities to and differences from non-
human primate vocalisations (Fedurek & Slocombe, 2011; see also Box 4 and
Chapters 17 and 18). Some of the similarities and differences concern the neural
basis of language production and processing (Ch. 14). Such questions have in turn
inspired research in primate neurophysiology (e.g. Platt & Ghazanfar, 2010).
Arguments against information
The classic objection against information concerns evolution: given
how selection operates, signals simply could not evolve in order to convey
information (Box 3). This objection was subsequently refuted. But new concerns
took its place. Here I mention two lines of argument.
Problems surrounding the core concepts
One line of argument is that central concepts such as information are
poorly understood and mired in difficulties. Often information is defined
vaguely or not at all (Rendall et al., 2009), and consequently it is unclear how
something so vague and abstract can be reconciled with causal concepts like
function and mechanism (Owren & Rendall, 2001). A related worry is that
informational concepts aremerelymetaphors. For instance, ‘information trans-
fer’ evokes some kind of concrete entity which senders hand over to receivers
like a parcel; but there is no such thing, of course (Owren & Rendall, 2001;
Rendall et al., 2009). It is worth noting that proponents of information have
acknowledged difficulties with their key concepts but regarded them as solvable
animal signals. This idea is mostly rejected nowadays (Fitch, 2010; but see
Bar-On & Green, 2010). Most contemporary theories of language evolution
are concerned with the evolution of our ‘proto-language’, i.e. with the
order in which the various components of our language faculty evolved in
the hominid lineage that descended from our last common ancestor with
chimpanzees (including its initial modality). The theories fall into three
broad groups, proposing lexical, gestural and musical proto-languages,
respectively (reviewed in Fitch, 2010; Wheeler et al., 2011). Some theorists
emphasise the extent to which the evolution of human language (as
communication systems) depended on prior conditions, such as
social interactions, context of use and capabilities like a theory
of mind (Sperber & Origgi, 2010). (The relation between animal
signalling and human language is further explored in Chapters 17 and 18.)
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(e.g. Burghardt, 1970; Markl, 1985; Hasson, 1994; Dawkins, 1995; Maynard
Smith & Harper, 1995; Philips & Austad, 1996; Evans, 1997; Seyfarth et al., 2010).
A bad heuristic
As a specifically linguistic metaphor (Owren & Rendall, 2001; Owren
et al., 2010), information is anthropomorphic (Owings & Morton, 1997) and
strongly biases our perspective on animal communication (Rendall et al.,
2009): the informational view highlights whatever is similar to human lan-
guage and neglects the rest. For example, our understanding of signal process-
ing is skewed in favour of cognitive mechanisms (Owings & Morton, 1997;
Owren & Rendall, 1997), especially in favour of cortical processing of the sort
familiar from conceptual representation and language comprehension in
humans (Owren & Rendall, 2001). The significance of non-cortical signal pro-
cessing is downplayed (e.g. motivational effects in songbirds; see ‘Assessment/
management’ above). Seyfarth et al. (2010) reject these criticisms. Information,
they argue, is a non-linguistic concept, simply referring to the idea that the
correlations between signals and conditions enable predictions (see ‘Colloquial
information’). Furthermore, information has not biased our view because, for
instance, it underpinned the discovery of dissimilarities between human and
non-human primate vocalisations (Box 4).
The chapters in this volume explore these and other arguments both in favour
of information (Chapters 1, 2, 4, 11–13, 15–17) and against it (Chapters 6–9). But it
is time to consider arguments surrounding manipulation.
Arguments concerning manipulation
The overall argument advanced in favour of influence views is that they
do not suffer the difficulties of informational approaches. In particular, explan-
ations in terms of manipulation are thought to be neither metaphoric nor
biased against non-cognitive signal processing (e.g. Owings & Morton, 1998;
Rendall et al., 2009). But influence models have seen their share of criticism.
The following two difficulties stand out.
The rarity of direct impact
The affect induction model predicts that many primate calls have a
direct impact on conserved, subcortical systems (see ‘Affect induction’ above).
Therefore, calls with similar acoustic properties should elicit similar reactions,
whereas calls with different properties should not. But neither prediction is well
supported (Seyfarth et al., 2010). First, calls with similar acoustic properties can
often elicit different reactions depending on context. For instance, vervets
hearing an eagle alarm call run into bushes; but if they are already there, they
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usually do not show any overt behavioural response (Seyfarth et al., 1980).
Second, vocalisations with very different acoustic properties can nonetheless
elicit the same response (Box 2).
Inconsistency with evolutionary theory
Manipulation is often interpreted as implying a disadvantage to
receivers (see ‘Manipulation and influence’ above). Disadvantaged receivers
will be selected to decrease their responsiveness to manipulative signals until
they ignore them. At that point senders cease to benefit from signalling (Box 3).
Senders will then be selected for reducing their signalling costs, until eventually
the signalling system disappears altogether (Searcy & Nowicki, 2005). But signal
systems are ubiquitous, so the influence model must be wrong (Seyfarth et al.,
2010). Defenders of manipulation theories concede that receivers will evolve
defence mechanisms against manipulation. But they argue that, owing to trade-
offs and the dynamics of arms races, counter-selection need not always lead to
the elimination of signalling systems (Rendall et al., 2009; but see Bradbury &
Vehrencamp, 2011b).
This section has sketched some of the major lines of conflict in the debate
about informational and non-informational approaches to animal communica-
tion.Wehave seen that both sides have advanced powerful arguments. Thismay
explain why the two approaches are sometimes seen as complementary rather
than incompatible (e.g. Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Owings & Morton, 1998;
Carazo & Font, 2010). The following sectionmoves beyond the to-and-fro within
animal communication studies. It takes a broader andmore abstract look at key
concepts of the information view, some of which come with heavy philosoph-
ical baggage. Unpacking some of the baggage, if ever so cursorily, can shed light
on theoretical commitments and opportunities.
Philosophical perspectives
Scientific realism
We can bring the information debate into sharper focus by situating it
in the wider debate about scientific realism. Local scientific realists hold that at
least some of our best scientific theories are (approximately) true and that
some of their central terms refer to things in the world. At first blush, the
claim that signals convey information is a local realist claim about a specific
theoretical entity, information. It seems to imply that there is something in the
world to which ‘conveying information’ refers, for example a capacity to enable
predictions, and that signals do in fact have this capacity. By contrast, the
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claim that information is a metaphor denies that the word ‘information’ picks
out anything in the world. The metaphor view is thus an anti-realist position
about information.
However, informational views are not committed to realism about informa-
tion. Proponents of information sometimes emphasise the heuristic value of
concepts such as information and mental states while remaining neutral about
any mechanistic implications (certain passages in Cheney and Seyfarth,1990,
and Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003). This approach echoes Dennett’s (1983) ‘inten-
tional stance’. The intentional stance recommends attributing mental states
(goals, beliefs, desires) to animals in order to explain and predict their behav-
iour. It involves no assumptions about the internal, neural structure of these
states; it does not even presuppose that animals possess any belief- or desire-like
states at all. Treating animals as if they possessed mental states is justified
simply to the extent that such practices increase explanatory and predictive
power. By analogy, an ‘informational stance’ would recommend attributing
information to signals in order to explain and predict behaviour without assum-
ing anything about the nature or existence of information. The intentional (and
informational) stance regards scientific and theoretical concepts primarily as
tools for explanation. This is a form of instrumentalism, and adopting this
version of instrumentalism with respect to information radically changes how
we ought to assess informational claims. Rather than asking whether it is true
that signals carry information we should ask whether such a claim is useful.
However, this approach to information would still be vulnerable against argu-
ments targeting its heuristic value (cf. Barret & Rendall, 2010).
A family of information concepts
Attempts to define the key notions of the informational view are
sometimes dismissed as semantic squabbles. The point of definitions some-
times is semantic, e.g. when attempting to fix the meaning of a word like
‘communication’. And disputes about which term to use for a given phenom-
enon can indeed be fruitless (although unifying language use can reduce
misunderstandings). But sometimes it is not so clear what sorts of phenom-
ena there are in the first place, and then definitions can be an important
means of tracking distinguishing features (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003).
For instance, the goal of distinguishing between “cost-added signals” and
“indices” was not to regiment language use, but to acknowledge that signals
can differ markedly in the evolutionary mechanisms securing their reliabil-
ity (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003).
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In philosophical jargon, definitions that aim to identify the key features of
some phenomenon X are usually called ‘theories of X’ or ‘accounts of X’.
Philosophers have developed numerous theories of phenomena such as com-
munication, information, representation, meaning and reference. This section
sketches some of the insights most relevant to animal communication
(although it can do no more than scratch the surface).
(1) Information
For many philosophers, information is simply a relation between two
facts or events, something requiring no receivers, nominds, cognition or knowl-
edge. Dretske (1981) was among the first to suggest that information is an
‘objective commodity’, a mind-independent relation in the world. He held
that some state or event A carries the information that another state or event
B obtains if there is a probabilistic relation between them, i.e. if A makes B
certain (specifically, if A’s occurrence increases the probability of B’s occurrence
to 1, and if that probability is less than 1 otherwise). One of the most attractive
features of Dretske’s theory is that information consists in a non-mysterious,
probabilistic relation between states (it is ‘naturalistic’). One of the arguably less
attractive features is that it requires A to raise B’s probability to 1: which events
are ever so tightly linked? Several philosophers have therefore turned toweaker
notions of information (e.g. Millikan, 2004; Shea, 2007; Scarantino & Piccinini,
2010; see also Chapters 2 and 5).
(2) Representation
Philosophers usually distinguish sharply between information and rep-
resentation. Carrying information about B implies that B exists (see above);
whereas representing something as being B does not imply that it is B.
Consider the philosophers’ paradigm of representational entities, beliefs and
desires. My belief that the sky is blue is a mental state that represents the sky as
being blue (i.e. that the sky is blue is the belief’s representational content). My
belief may be false; just believing the sky is blue does not make it so. Hence,
mental states can be about states that may or may not obtain (or be about things
that may or may not exist). This remarkable property of mental states of being
directed at things is also known as intentionality2 and has nothing to do with
having intentions (for related issues see Box 5).
2 Intentionality (with a ‘t’) must be distinguished from intensionality (with an ‘s’). The
former is a property of mental states, i.e. their ‘aboutness’. The latter is a property of
languages rather than mental states, and it is defined in terms of certain inferential
principles (see also Box 5).
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Some philosophers maintain that intentionality and representational con-
tent consist in physical and biological relations that are as non-mysterious as
the relations constituting information. Dretske (1988) argued, for instance,
that any state or event A represents a state or event B if A has the biological
Box 5 Referential opacity and indeterminacy of translation
Referential opacity and indeterminacy of translation are two
philosophical ideas which must be mentioned because they have made
their way into the ethological literature. But their value for ethology is
doubtful.
Referential opacity
Suppose the statement “Susan believes that Bob Dylan is a musician”
is true (i.e. she believes Dylan is a musician); now replace ‘Bob Dylan’ with
his birth name ‘Robert Allen Zimmerman’. The new sentence “Susan
believes that Robert Allen Zimmerman is a musician” may well be false, for
example if Susan does not know that both names refer to the same man. A
sentence is said to create a ‘referentially opaque’ context for an expression
if one can change the sentence’s truth value by replacing the expression
with a different term that refers to the same thing. Sentences about mental
states such as beliefs and desires are referentially opaque. For this reason,
referential opacity (or the broader notion of intensionality; see footnote 2) is
sometimes taken to indicate the presence of intentionality (e.g. Chisholm,
1957; Dennett, 1983). But this is highly controversial (e.g. Allen, 1995;
Crane, 2001).
Indeterminacy of translation
An anthropologist tries to translate into English the words of a newly
discovered tribe. Quine (1960) argued that the difficulties in translating, say,
‘gavagai’ as ‘rabbit’ show that there is no fact of the matter about which
translation is correct; indeed, there is no fact of the matter about what
‘gavagai’ means, or even ‘rabbit’. Quine’s point is much more radical than
usually interpreted: it is not that identifying word meanings is difficult (cf.
Hauser, 1996; Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007), but rather that words lack
(determinate) meanings. Quine’s meaning scepticism is now widely
rejected (reviewed in Miller, 2006).
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function to carry the information that B obtains. Dretske’s proposal is relevant
for present purposes because it implies that representational content is not
the privilege of mental states alone: animal signals have representational
content simply by virtue of having evolved in order to carry information;
receivers do not need to mentally represent referents. Talk of ‘false’ animal
signals is then not metaphoric, but expresses the idea that signals can repre-
sent what does not exist (but see Ch. 17). More recent accounts of representa-
tion deviate in various ways from Dretske’s proposal, but accept that animal
signals can represent states and events (e.g. Millikan, 1984, 2004; Bekoff &
Allen, 1992; Stegmann, 2009).
(3) Communication
On the informational view, animal communication involves conveying
information from senders to receivers. The cognitively most demanding view of
conveying information requires signals to elicit mental representations in
receivers (see ‘Colloquial information’ above). But even this considerable degree
of cognitive complexity pales in comparison with the complexity normally
associated with human communication.
The orthodox view of human communication is due to Grice (but see
Millikan, 1984; Green, 2007). For Grice, speakers communicate when they
utter sentences with certain “communicative intentions” (reviewed in Neale,
1992). The simplest of these intentions is that listeners believe that p (where p is
the proposition the speaker intends to communicate, e.g. “the tree is green”). In
order to meet even this basic condition of communication, speakers need to
have at least one kind of mental state: intentions. More importantly, they need
to be able to attribute to listeners the belief that p. Gricean communication
requires still more complex mental state attributions, e.g. that listeners recog-
nise that the speaker intends them to believe that p. Despite decades of research,
there is little evidence that non-human primates attribute even simple beliefs,
let alone false ones, to others (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007; Rosati et al., 2010). To
the contrary, there is evidence that primates fail to reason about the beliefs of
others (although some species attribute mental states such as intentions, goals
and visual experience and therefore have a ‘theory ofmind’ of sorts, reviewed in
Rosati, Santos & Hare, 2010).
(4) Meaning
What speakers communicate is what they intend to convey by uttering
a sentence. But the sentences employed to convey the intendedmeaning possess
their own conventional or linguistic meanings, i.e. meanings which are inde-
pendent of what speakers intend to convey by uttering the sentences. Perhaps
A primer on animal communication 29
the most influential theory of linguistic meaning holds that a sentence’s mean-
ing is its truth condition (e.g. Davidson, 1967). On this view, the meaning of the
sentence “the tree is green” is the state of the world that makes this sentence
true: the fact that the tree is green.
Critics of information concepts allege that comparing animal signals with
human words is bound to skew our explanations of behaviour in terms of
linguistic meaning analogues. But comparisons with human language can also
include pragmatic aspects of communication. Horn (1997) suggested, for
instance, that animal signals are analogous to speech acts. Speech acts are
actions performed by uttering sentences, and they are effective primarily
because of social rules, not because of the linguistic meaning attached to the
sentences we utter (Austin, 1962). Note that there are other approaches in
philosophy of language that minimise the role of linguistic meanings and
that have been applied to animal signals (McAninsh et al., 2009; Bar-On &
Green, 2010).
(5) Reference
Names and general terms pick out (or refer to) particular individuals
and kinds of things, respectively (e.g. ‘Simon’ picks out Simon, ‘water’ picks
out water). Much philosophical work has focused on understanding the mech-
anism that secures the link between a term and what it picks out: why does
‘water’ refer to water rather than something else, and why does it pick out
anything at all? The traditional answer points to the minds of speakers and
listeners. A term like ‘water’ is associated with descriptions (or a set of con-
cepts) that speakers have in their minds, for example “– is composed of H2O
molecules” or “– is transparent”. The term ‘water’ refers to a particular body of
fluid on the condition that this fluid exactly matches the descriptions. Ogden
and Richards’ (1923) “triangle of meaning” illustrates the descriptivist
approach, which remains popular in the cognitive sciences. Crucially, descrip-
tivism underlies much reasoning about referential signals: signals count as
referential in a strong, word-like sense only if they elicit mental representa-
tions (see ‘Colloquial information’ above).
However, descriptivism in its classical form has been discredited in philos-
ophy of language. Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) argued that reference
depends on a term bearing the right kind of causal connection to a thing, not
on the associations or concepts that a term evokes in speakers and in hearers.
The causal-historical approach has its own problems. But the negative point,
that reference is not determined by what speakers and hearers have in their
minds (‘semantic externalism’), is well supported.
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Outlook
Perhaps the most obvious conclusion from this survey is that the suit-
ability of information and/or manipulation for explaining animal communica-
tion is not simply an empirical matter. It also depends on which notions of
information and manipulation one endorses.
Critics of information deserve credit for insisting that information concepts
are still poorly understood. Several distinct notions of colloquial information
are in use (a fact which largely has gone unnoticed), and it is unclear how they
relate to one another. Moreover, each notion raises further questions which are
seldom addressed rigorously: for example, on the view that carrying informa-
tion consists in allowing predictions, should non-cognitive processes count as
predictions? Furthermore, mathematical models of signal evolution use an
information concept that appears to be distinct from the one used in applica-
tions of statistical decision theory (reliability versus changes to estimates of
probability), and again it is unclear how they interrelate. However, inmy view it
is premature to conclude from these gaps that information concepts are inap-
propriate. First, it is not obvious that the gaps need to be filled, because tools
such as statistical decision theory have proven fruitful without a unified, clear-
cut concept of information. Second, it is likely that the gaps can be filled
eventually, e.g. by integrating philosophical research on information concepts.
The concept of manipulation faces similar challenges. The costs-to-receivers
interpretation, on which the opponents of manipulation have focused almost
exclusively, should bemore clearly distinguished from proximate interpretations.
One proximate interpretation is that signals manipulate when receivers process
signals by non-cognitive mechanisms. Since signals can affect receivers through
either cognitive or non-cognitivemechanisms (or both, depending on the species),
manipulation should play a role in any comprehensive account of signal process-
ing. As far as I can see, this is the strongest argument for the importance of
manipulation. And it should carry some weight with those who identify informa-
tional communication with a certain type of proximate mechanism of signal
processing by receivers (i.e. a mechanism involving representations of referents).
Such a proximate interpretation exacts its price, however. It ignores the uses of
information in, for instance, evolutionary models; it undermines any outright
rejection of information, because some receivers do process signals cognitively
(and, hence, informationally); and it seems to requires a firm distinction between
cognitive and non-cognitive mechanisms of signal processing.
I wish to resist characterising information in proximate terms. I believe that
the informational approach is valuable, not because it captures a kind of prox-
imate mechanism of signal processing, but because it provides ultimate
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(etiological) explanations of receiver responses (Stegmann, 2005, 2009). Let us
return to the fireflies. The disposition of male fireflies to approach certain light
pulses is explained, on the informational approach, by the signal’s information
that there is a receptive female. The presence of a receptive female at the source
of a certain light pulse is, plausibly, the reason why males were selected to
approach the light source. In other words, the information content of the light
pulses specifies the reason by virtue of which males acquired their response
dispositions over evolutionary time. This idea can be generalised as follows.
Asserting that a receiver responds with R to a signal because (1) the signal carries
the information that p is another way of saying that the receiver respondswith R
because (1*) p caused receivers to evolve/learn the disposition to do R. In other
words, citing the information content p explains R by identifying the reason that
caused receivers to evolve/learn the R-disposition in the first place. The informa-
tion content therefore provides an ultimate explanation of R. The approach just
sketched is compatible with requiring that full explanations of R ought to
include R’s proximate mechanisms, as well. However, whether or not themech-
anisms involve mental representations would be irrelevant to whether or not
the signal carries information.
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